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Nuclear M

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY North Korea

REPORT

SUBJECT The North Korean Air Force

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SUPPLEMENT TO AF FORM 112

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The sign of hostilities schemed by puppet North Korean regime after the April 19 Revolution.

The puppet premier KIM, Il Song is calling for the party members to devote maximum effort to political activities (suggesting a propaganda offensive against South Korea) with a view to secure political initiative and all military personnel's possession of strong pride as statesmen by means of taking a favorable attitude (mainly in the domain of propaganda) for the purpose of securing political superiority, since free passage between south and north is expected to be realized within a minimum of one to two years or maximum of three to four years, considering the current political trends.

He emphasized that within the period not exceeding ten years, Korean unification is to be realized, like the situation of immediate post-liberation.

Around the end of May, after the April 19 Democratic Revolution, the ranking officers in charge of political affairs summoned all of the officers of the 26th Regiment, 2nd Division, and gave them lectures on the domestic political affairs.

These lectures are one of the political activities conducted as an emergent countermeasure after the April 19 Revolution.

In conformity with the instruction of North Korean Ministry of Defense, the political indoctrination was given throughout the entire military commands for fifteen minutes prior to the beginning of straight time, every morning on international and domestic affairs, pointing out that the South Korean people are yearning for Socialism, considering the demonstrations staged by the South Korean peoples during the April 19 Revolution.

Since the United States forces will withdraw from Korean territory within one or two years at most, free passage between south and north will be realized by means of political negotiations with revolution strength and people in south Korea, after the withdrawal of U. S. forces.

In case the political negotiations are disturbed by the south Korean reactionists, the North Korean People's Army will not hesitate to adopt subversive activities that imply the provocation of hostilities.

Each North Korean airfield placed two squadrons on alert since July 1959, under the order of the Commanding General, North Korean Air Force. Especially after the April 19 Revolution, pilots attached to certain fighter regiments were prohibited to drink wine as well as to go out, even on Sunday.

By reinforcement of ammunition (four times that of prior April 19 Revolution), the North Korean Air Force unceasingly prepares for combat readiness, and they excuse it as the emergent defense measure against possible ROK provocative activities.

North Korea's slogan "the completion of combat readiness" appeared since early 1959, and after 1960, the word "completion" was emphasized, and its movement was overtly distinguished. this decision had been adopted after the plenary conference of military personnel subordinated to the North Korean Ministry of Defense. Consequently, it was decided to establish the target to complete combat readiness within 1960. In this effort, every effort was made in the following areas, prior to the targets to secure top-level technicians who were mainly trained and politically indoctrinated.

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1. Special Establishment and Reinforcement of Day-duty Squadrons. Since August 1959, under the orders of the Commanding General, North Korean Air Force, two squadrons of day-duty aircraft were placed on alert status at each airfield, but in 1959, the pilots were not apted to agree to the orders. Since 1960, to thoroughly carry out the mission, pilots were forced to wear full equipment in the barracks and await orders. Pilots had the mission to take off within ten minutes after receiving the orders in the event of emergency. Especially after April, averagely two or three times per day, the special training was conducted.

2. Reinforcement of Ammunition Supply: Early in June 1960, all airfields have reinforced the ammunition supply as follows for the purpose of combat readiness, preparing for the current political situation.

a. Bombs: Except the present equiped one pair of bombs (two 250K for MIG-17, two 100K for MIG-15 and two 50K for long-range fighters), additional three pairs of bombs are planned to be equipped.

b. Auto-machinegun and Rifle Ammunition: Reinforced by four-fold larger than the present quantity of equipment (800). Each airfield was ordered to secure the basic quantity of them after the calculating the reinforced fire strength.

3. Training for the Attack Against the ROK Airfields and Missile Bases: Since 1960, the training for attack against ROK airfields and atomic gun bases was reinforced as ever, and navigators of the regiment described the current status of ROK airfields, and pilots were to exchange each opinion concerning the effective attacks. After it, according to the prior scheduled operational plans, the conclusion was given, connecting with the pilots discussions.

The 2nd Division is responsible for the mission to attack against Kangnung Airfield, and in the bombing against this base, it is planned to drop the torpedo bombs (after bombing, it plunges into the ground - depth is unknown, and it explodes under the ground to increase the square of explosion. Weight ranges from 50K to 250K) to the runway. Kangnung Airfield is a preliminary base in the ROK, but as a radar site is near it, it has great military importance. In attacking, aircraft should use an altitude of 5,000 meters and conduct the attacks three or four times, and stage the air combat for five minutes. After it, it should return to home base at the altitude of 5,000 meters, but fuel will not be in shortage. (See Attack Sketch)

It is said that such training for attacks against ROK airfields is given once per month, and for the purpose of thorough acknowledgement, examinations are given. After the April 19 Revolution, North Korean Air Force training the Chief of Reconnaissance as the the ROK military situations (mainly as to ROK-US operational structure, combat capability and information on Osan, Suwon and Kimp'o airfields) and indulged into the complete readiness for the necessary attacks.

4. Reinforcement of Sea Attacks: While in 1958 and 1959, the training for the fleet attacks was not active, the beginning of 1960 marked a considerable reinforcement of this type training and the method of attacks is pursuant to that of Soviet operations. (Soviet type operation - At low altitude of 50 meters, escaping the fire weapons of the fleet, attacks will be made by using the torpedo bombers.

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5. Synthetic Air Force Training: In May 1960, during one day, North Korean Air Force staged synthetic training and this training was classified into two parts; interception and attack. Enemy aircraft were assumed to be IL-28s. and as the result of the criticism of the training

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it was estimated that 2nd Division scored the top achievement, and the 5th Division had no capacity, and the 1st Division had courage but selected the reckless operation.

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WYMSAN AF

P. M. Z.

* Altitude 500 Mtr
Speed per hour 750~800M

Kennung
3/8

15K


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Sketch of Bombers' Attack




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Sketch of NKAF Synthetic Operation Training



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The Sign of Hostilities Schemed by Puppet N.Korea after the April 19 Revolution.

The puppet premire Kim, Il Sun is calling for the party members' devoted political activities (suggest the propaganda offensive against South Korea) with view to secure political initiatives and all military personnel's possession of the strong pride as one of statesmen by means of taking favorable attitude (mainly in the domain of propaganda) for the purpose of securing the political superiority, since free passage between south and north is expected to be realized within min. one-two years or max. three-four years, considering the current political trends.

He emphasized that within the period not exceeding ten years, Korean unification is to be realized, like the situations of immediate post-liberation.

Around the end of May, after April 19 Democratic Revolution, the ranking officers in charge of political domain summoned all of the officers of 26th Regt., 2nd Div. and gave them lectures on the domestic political affairs.

These lectures are one of the political activities conducted as an emergent countermeasure after the April 19 Revolution.

In conformity with the instruction of KX MOD, the political indoctrination was given throughout the whole military personnels for fifteen minutes prior to the beginning of the straight time, every morning, on the international affairs (Congo, Cuba political movement, U-2 plane, and RB-47 accident) and domestic affairs (pointing that south Korean people are yearning for the Socialism, considering the demonstration staged by South Korean peoples, demanding the blame of anti-revolution influences, and April 19 Student Revolution).

Since the United States Forces will withdraw from Korean territory within one-two years or, at most, three-four years, Free passage between south and north Korea will be realized by means of political negotiations with revolution strength and people in south Korea, after the withdraw, of U.S. Forces.

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In case of that the political negotiation will be disturbed by the South Korean existing Reactionists, NK Peoples' Army will not hesitate to adopt the subversive activities that imply the provocation of hostilities.

Each North Korean A/F made two of squadrons awaiting for orders since July 1959, under the order of CG, NKAF.

Especially after the April 19 Revolution, pilots attached to the fighter regiment (Non-20's numbered regiments) are prohibited to drink wine as well as to go out even in Sunday.

By reinforcement of ammunitions (four-fold larger than that of prior April 19 Revolution) NKAF unceasingly prepares the combat readiness, and they excuse it as the emergent defense measure against ROK's possible provocative activities.

NK Completed the Combat Readness

NK's slogan, "the Completion of Combat Readness" appeared since early in the 1959, and after 1960, the word "Completion" was emphasized, and its movement was overtly distinguished.

The information source said that he believe this decision had been adopted after the plenary conference of military personnel subordinated to the NK MOD.

Prior to the decision NK MOD directly received the order from the (Center" (source considers it to be the Central Party Committee).

Consequently, NK MOD had decisive target to establish the complete combat readiness within 1960. For this purpose, every efforts were paid in the followings, prior to the targets to secure the top-level technicians who were mainly trained and politically indoctrinated in the year of 1959.

1. Special Establishment and Reinforcement of Day-duty Sq. by A/F

Since August 1959, under the order of CG, NKAF made the two squadrons of Day-duty awaiting for the order in each A/F, and in 1959, pilots were apted not to agree the orders.

Since 1960, to thoroughly carry out the missions, pilots were forced to wear the full equipments in the near barracks and to await for orders. Pilots had the missions to take off within ten minutes from receiving the orders, in the events of emergency.

Especially after April, averagely two or three times per day, the special training was conducted.

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This Day-duty squadron has four planes of Day-duty (that are available to take off immediately) await for orders to accomplish the assigned missions.

2. Reinforcement of Ammunition Supply

Early in June, 1960, the all A/F have reinforced the ammunition supply mentioned as follows, for the purpose of the completion of combat readiness, preparing for the current political situations.

a. Bomb

Except the present equipped one pair of bombs (two bombs--MIG-17 equipped two of 250K, and MIG-15, two of 100K, and long-range fighter, 50K), additional three pairs of bombs are planned to be equipped.

b. Auto-machine gun and rifle ammunition

Reinforced by four-fold larger than the present quantity of equipment (200)

Each A/F was ordered to secure the the basic quantity of them after the calculating the reinforced fire strength.

3. Training for the Attack Against the ROK A/F and Missile Bases

Since 1960, the training for the attack against the ROK A/F and atomic-gun bases was reinforced as ever, and navigators of the regiment described the current status of ROK A/F, and pilots were to exchange each opinions concerning the effective attacks. After it, according to the prior scheduled operational plans, the conclusion was given, connecting with the pilots' discussions.

The 2nd Div. is responsible for the missions to attack against the KANUMA A/F, ROKAF, and in the bombing against this base, it is planned to drop the torpedo-bombs (after bombing, it plunges into the ground--depth is unknown, and it explodes under the ground to increase the square of explosion. weight of them ranges from 50K to 250K) to the runway.

KANUMA A/F is preliminary air base in ROKAF, but as radar site is near it, it has great military importance.

In attacking, A/F should drop the bomb from the altitude of 5000 mtr. and conduct the attacks three-four times, and stage the air combat for five minutes. After it, it should return home base at the altitude of 5000 mtr, but fuel will not be in shortage. (see the attack sketch)

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It is said that such training for the attacks against ROKAF A/B, was given twice per month, and for the purpose of the through acknowledgement, final examinations took place.

After April 19 Revolution, NKAF trained the chief of reconnaissance as to the ROK military situations (Mainly as to ROK-US Air Force operational structure, combat capacity, and informations on the Ocean, Surron, and Kinspo A/B) and indulged into the complete readiness for the necessary attacks.

4. Reinforcement of Sea Attack

While in 1958 and 1959, the training for the fleet attacks was not active, since the beginning of 1960, the training was considerably reinforced and the method of attacks is pursuant to that of Soviet operations.

* Soviet Type operation

At the low altitude of 50 mtr, escaping the fire weapons of the fleet, attacks will be made by using the torpedor-bombs.

5. Synthetic Air Force Training

In May 1960, during one day, NKAF staged the synthetic training and this training was classified into tow parts-attack and interception of bombers.

Enemy aircraft were assumed to be IL-28, and as result of the criticism of the training.

it was estimated that 2nd Div. secured the top achievement, and 5th Div. had no capacity, and 1st Div. had courage but selected the reckless operation. (see Incls. 2 and 3)

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<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
IN KAF (564th AU):	Area between Mirim and Sadong	
Headquarters, 1st Div.		
60th Regt.	Sunchon	Conversion to MIG scheduled
59th Regt.	Dukchang	
25th Regt.	Sunchon	
Headquarters, 2nd Div. Sundeok		
58th Regt.	Unknown	
26th Regt.	(3675th AU)	
56th Regt.	(867)	
Headquarters, 3rd Div. Hwangju		
57th Regt.	Mirim	Twenty of pilots assigned Graduates allotted in July 1957
61st Regt.	Hwangju	
27th Regt.	P'yongchang	
4th Div. Early in this month disorganized		
36th Indept. Regiment	Wiju	
24th Recon. Regt.	Sunan	
5th Div.		
54th Regt.	Kaesong	
55th Regt.	Kaesong	
Unknown	Unknown	

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Command Sq.	Mirim
Avi. School	Chongjin
MIG branch school	Heamsen

Target of air operation for pilots of 26th Regt., 2nd Div. was to accomplish the training for the two squadron level combat, for new pilots Commanding personnel (higher than flight commander) are to complete the readiness of squadron-level battle.

Personnel:

CG. NKAF Lt. Gen. Choi, Kwang (ex-Dean of Army College)
appointed as of 24 Oct. '58

Deputy CG. (Political) Maj. Gen. Choi, Chong Kwon (former Deputy
Director of Propaganda Dept., Central Party)
younger brother of Choi, Yung Kwon

Comdr. (flying) Non-assignment

Comdr. (Technical) (surname unknown), Yong Sa

Comdr., 1st Div. Unknown

Comdr., 2nd Div. Senior Col. An, Yong Kuk

Comdr., 3rd Div. Col. Choi, Kee Hyong
(former Comdr., 24th Recon. Regt.)
appointed early in 1959

Comdr., 36th Independent Regt. Unknown

Comdr., 24th Recon. Regt. Unknown

Supintendent, Aviation Schools: Senior Col. Han, Hae Suk

Supintendent, MIG branch School: Col. Unknown

Comdr., GMS Sq. Senior Col. Pak, Chong Sik

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8. Status of KMAF (based on interrogation up to 24:00, 3 Aug 1960):

a. T-1 (equivalent of JP-4) is supplied in annual allotments, subject to further requisition in case of shortage. For approx. 15 days during the summer of 1958, training had to be interrupted due to exhaustion of fuel stocks.

b. T-1 supply was generally considered adequate, but effort is being made for fuel conservation. Failure to accomplish flight missions becomes a subject for reprimand for "waste of fuel."

c. KMAF A/C were grounded from 22:52, 30 May until 5 June 1960 after an MIG-17 of the 58th Regt, piloted by a 1st Lt (recently re-assigned from 1st Div), crashed on the mountainside during a diving practice. Flight in 1st Div was suspended for approx. one (1) week after this incident

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The entire period of flight suspension, following the MIG-17 crash which took place at 15:00, 25 May 1960, was devoted to technical instruction.

As regards indications of enemy intent to mount attacks against the South, subject stated four(4) fighters were kept on alert, with two (2) on cockpit alert and the other two (2) on strip alert, while additional two (2) squadrons were in stand-by. (Until last year, stand-by consisted of either one (1) squadron or one (1) flight.) At night, two (2) MIG-17 interceptors (referred to as PF ()) were put on alert at the Sondek A/P.

the year 1960 was designated by the NKAP as the "Year of Combat Readiness."

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- e. There was a complete absence of training flights on 1 and 2 Aug 1960, owing to a check-up and policing in preparation for the Aug 15 celebrations. In the 5th Div (based at Kanch'on exd. Daeang), a ground check-up involving an MIG-15 BIS took place early in July, and a training program of one (1) week's duration was initiated on 1 Aug.
- f. On 3 Aug, four (4) MIG-15s and 11 MIG-15 BISs of the 26th Regt conducted a flight training starting 7:30 hours. Training was resumed at 11:40 hours.
- g. Disposition of NKAP Units:
 - (1). NKAP Headquarters: Halfway between Mirin and Sadong (referred to as 564th AU).

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(2) 1st Div - 60th Regt: Sungh'on (conversion to MIG-19s planned).

- 59th Regt: Puksh'ang.

6 25th Regt: Sungh'on (Tug Bn).

(3) 2nd Div headquarters: Sondok (884th AV).

- 58th Regt: Sondok

- 26th Regt: Wonsan (36875th AV).

- 56th Regt: Wonsan (88- AV).

(4) 3rd Div headquarters: Hwangju (?).

- 57th Regt: Mirim.

- 61st Regt: Hwangju (with 20 new pilots)

- 27th Regt: Yunggang (graduates of July 1957)

(5) 4th Div headquarters: Deactivated early in 1960.

- 35th Independent Regt: Uiju.

- 24th Rescue Regt: Sunan.

(6) 5th Div headquarters: Kaesh'on (?).

- 54th Regt: Kusong

- 55th Regt: Kaesh'on

- w/1 Regt: Location u/k.

(7) GMD Sq: Mirim.

(8) AF Academy located at Ch'angjin (moved from Yenchi in Manchuria in July 1959), with a branch school at Homsun.

h. NKAF Personalities:

(1) CG, NKAF: Lt Gen Choe Kwang, former Superintendent,

NIA University; assumed command 24 Oct 1958.

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- (2) Deputy CG, NKAF (Political): Maj Gen Choe Chang Ken, younger brother of Choe Yong Kwon; formerly propaganda chief, party Central Committee.
- (3) Deputy CG, NKAF (Flying): Vacant.
- (4) Deputy CG, NKAF (Technical): Maj Gen Kim Ung Soe.
- (5) CG, 1st Div: w/k.
- (6) Cdr, 2nd Div: Sr Col An Yong Keok
- (7) Cdr, 3rd Div: Col Choe Ki Hyung, formerly Co, 24th Recon Regt; appointed Div Cdr last year.
- (8) Cdr, CMB Sq: Sr Col Pak Chong Sik.
- (9) Superintendent, Air Officers Academy: Sr Col Han Tae Soek
Chief, branch schools: Col (?).

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Annex #4

Equipment

Item	Qty	Description	
1.	1	Parashute, C-3 Type	50X1-HUM
2.	1	Lift kit	
3.	1	Receiver, -5, 2-57x.	
4.	1	Microphone mouthpiece, KM-16	50X1-HUM
5.	1	Passbook wallet.	
6.	1	Pistol	
7.	2	Magazines	
8.	14	Pistol ammo.	
9.	1	Pilot's suit.	
10.	1 pair	Drawers	
11.	1	T-shirt.	
12.	1	Belt.	
13.	1 pair	Flight boots	
14.	1 pair	Stocks	

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